Joseph M. Vukov, PhD - on leave Spring 2025

Books

• Staying Human in an Era of Artificial Intelligence. New City Press. 2024.
  AI poses a real and present danger. It contains the capacity to amplify social problems, drive a wedge further into our already-polarized society, and sow seeds of distrust in communities and personal relationships. When approached without a robust sense of human dignity, AI also threatens to undermine our self-understanding. To a degree beyond any previous technology, AI can make us forget oursel…Read more

  AI poses a real and present danger. It contains the capacity to amplify social problems, drive a wedge further into our already-polarized society, and sow seeds of distrust in communities and personal relationships. When approached without a robust sense of human dignity, AI also threatens to undermine our self-understanding. To a degree beyond any previous technology, AI can make us forget ourselves. In this new era of AI, we must consciously make a choice: to stay human. In this book I provide a map and the tools for doing just that.
• The Perils of Perfection: On the Limits and Possibilities of Human Enhancement. New City Press. 2023.
  Are you left dizzy by the vast array of new technologies? Skeptical about the latest Silicon Valley craze being worth the hype, yet wary of those who would throw these technologies to the curb? Me too. This book seeks to avoid landmines in our quest for perfection while offering strategies for evaluating both the possibilities and the limits of human enhancement. Think of it as a guide for navigat…Read more

  Are you left dizzy by the vast array of new technologies? Skeptical about the latest Silicon Valley craze being worth the hype, yet wary of those who would throw these technologies to the curb? Me too. This book seeks to avoid landmines in our quest for perfection while offering strategies for evaluating both the possibilities and the limits of human enhancement. Think of it as a guide for navigating the perils of perfection while embracing the fullness of human dignity.
• Navigating Faith and Science. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.. 2022.
  Religious belief is often perceived as being in conflict with science--but does it have to be? Not usually, says Joseph Vukov. In this short, accessible guide, Vukov advances three models for Christians to utilize when navigating the relationship between science and faith: conflict, independence, and dialogue. He argues that dialogue is the ideal model to follow most of the time--but not necessari…Read more

  Religious belief is often perceived as being in conflict with science--but does it have to be? Not usually, says Joseph Vukov. In this short, accessible guide, Vukov advances three models for Christians to utilize when navigating the relationship between science and faith: conflict, independence, and dialogue. He argues that dialogue is the ideal model to follow most of the time--but not necessarily all the time. Through a philosophical approach grounded in compelling real-world examples, Vukov shows how no single model can be universally adequate, and how Christians must proceed with discernment according to the nature of the matter at hand. Considering a wide variety of illustrative issues--including cosmology, evolutionary biology, extraterrestrial life, miracles, brain death, and theoretical physics--Vukov introduces and describes each of the three models of interaction between faith and science, surveys their applications, and evaluates the effectiveness of each. Throughout, he encourages Christians to embrace a spirit of intellectual humility and remember that, at their best, faith and science converge in their relentless human pursuit of truth.

Published articles

• Organ Donation and Declaration of Death: Combined Neurologic and Cardiopulmonary Standards. The Linacre Quarterly 86. forthcoming. With Stephen E. Doran.
  Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ dono…Read more

  Prolonged survival after the declaration of death by neurologic criteria creates ambiguity regarding the validity of this methodology. This ambiguity has perpetuated the debate among secular and nondissenting Catholic authors who question whether the neurologic standards are sufficient for the declaration of death of organ donors. Cardiopulmonary criteria are being increasingly used for organ donors who do not meet brain death standards. However, cardiopulmonary criteria are plagued by conflict of interest issues, arbitrary standards for candidacy, and the lack of standardized protocols for organ procurement. Combining the neurological and cardiopulmonary standards into a single protocol would mitigate the weaknesses of both and provide greater biologic and moral certainty that a donor of unpaired vital organs is indeed dead.
• New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds: Causal Powers Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4): 777-795. 2024. With Charles Lassiter.
  In this paper, we describe causal powers realism as a conjunction of four claims: causal powers are not reducible to counterfactuals; they are empirically-discoverable; they manifest effects in conjunction with partners; and their manifestations empower further manifestations. We describe four challenges to extended mind theory and for each show how an ontology of causal powers realism either avoi…Read more

  In this paper, we describe causal powers realism as a conjunction of four claims: causal powers are not reducible to counterfactuals; they are empirically-discoverable; they manifest effects in conjunction with partners; and their manifestations empower further manifestations. We describe four challenges to extended mind theory and for each show how an ontology of causal powers realism either avoids or dissolves the problem. We close by suggesting that causal powers realism isn’t a competitor with extended mind theory but rather a new way to understand what it means for minds to be extended.
• The Ouroboros Threat. American Journal of Bioethics 23 (10): 58-60. 2023. With Tera Lynn Joseph, Gina Lebkuecher, Michelle Ramirez, and Michael B. Burns.
  Jorge Luis Borges introduces the mythical ouroboros as follows: “A third-century Greek amulet, to be found today in the British Museum, gives us an image that can better illustrate that infinitude:...
• Extended Frameworks for Extended Reality: Ethical Considerations. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 13 (3): 171-173. 2022. With Michael B. Burns, Gina Lebkuecher, Sophia Rahman, Maya Roytman, and Sydney Samoska.
  David Chalmers (2022) argues that reality as we encounter it in virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) is just as real as the everyday physical world. We may not agree with Chalmers’s prop...
• New Ontological Foundations for Extended Minds: Causal Powers Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1-19. 2022. With Charles Lassiter.
  In this paper, we describe causal powers realism as a conjunction of four claims: causal powers are not reducible to counterfactuals; they are empirically-discoverable; they manifest effects in conjunction with partners; and their manifestations empower further manifestations. We describe four challenges to extended mind theory and for each show how an ontology of causal powers realism either avoi…Read more

  In this paper, we describe causal powers realism as a conjunction of four claims: causal powers are not reducible to counterfactuals; they are empirically-discoverable; they manifest effects in conjunction with partners; and their manifestations empower further manifestations. We describe four challenges to extended mind theory and for each show how an ontology of causal powers realism either avoids or dissolves the problem. We close by suggesting that causal powers realism isn’t a competitor with extended mind theory but rather a new way to understand what it means for minds to be extended.
• Rationally Navigating Subjective Preferences in Memory Modification. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 47 (3): 424-442. 2022.
  Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, …Read more

  Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, MMTs do a particularly poor job at promoting the autonomy of their users. If this conclusion is true, moreover, it provides a fresh perspective on debates about the permissibility of MMTs. On the one hand, for those who would limit the use of MMTs to a narrow range of circumstances, the conclusion that MMTs are rarely preferable gives them further reason to eye MMTs with suspicion. On the other hand, for those who view MMTs as permissible in a wide range of circumstances, the conclusion may deflate their endorsement.
• Rationality and Cognitive Enhancement. Res Philosophica 98 (4): 597-618. 2021.
  When is it rational to undergo cognitive enhancement? In the case of what I’ll call massive cognitive enhancement, my answer is never. The reason is that one must base one’s decision to undergo massive cognitive enhancement on what I’ll call either phenomenal or non-phenomenal outcomes. If the former, the choice is not rational because massive cognitive enhancements are transformative and, I’ll ar…Read more

  When is it rational to undergo cognitive enhancement? In the case of what I’ll call massive cognitive enhancement, my answer is never. The reason is that one must base one’s decision to undergo massive cognitive enhancement on what I’ll call either phenomenal or non-phenomenal outcomes. If the former, the choice is not rational because massive cognitive enhancements are transformative and, I’ll argue with Paul (2015), transformative experiences cannot be chosen rationally. If the latter, the choice is not rational because it ought to be based at least partly on phenomenal outcomes. This argument, however, leaves open the idea that it may nonetheless be rational to choose massive cognitive enhancement for others—for example, one’s children. The article explores this possibility, arguing that choosing enhancement for others can be rational or moral, but not both.
• Harm Reduction Models: Roadmaps for Transformative Experiences. American Journal of Bioethics 21 (7): 63-65. 2021. With Kit Rempala, Marley Hornewer, Maya Roytman, Sydney Samoska, and Rohan Meda.
  Patients with severe and enduring anorexia nervosa have a relatively low chance of attaining the symptom-free recovery that traditional eating disorder treatment programs endorse (Bianchi, S...
• In search of an ontology for 4E theories: from new mechanism to causal powers realism. Synthese 199 (3-4): 9785-9808. 2021. With Charles Lassiter.
  Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended theorists do not typically focus on the ontological frameworks in which they develop their theories. One exception is 4E theories that embrace New Mechanism. In this paper, we endorse the New Mechanist’s general turn to ontology, but argue that their ontology is not the best on the market for 4E theories. Instead, we advocate for a different ontology: cau…Read more

  Embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended theorists do not typically focus on the ontological frameworks in which they develop their theories. One exception is 4E theories that embrace New Mechanism. In this paper, we endorse the New Mechanist’s general turn to ontology, but argue that their ontology is not the best on the market for 4E theories. Instead, we advocate for a different ontology: causal powers realism. Causal powers realism posits that psychological manifestations are the product of mental powers, and that mental powers are empirically-discoverable features of individuals that account for the causal work those individuals do. We contend that causal powers realism provides a unifying framework for the central commitments of 4E theories, as well as additional resources for theorizing in a 4E framework. And while New Mechanism offers some of these resources as well, we argue that causal powers realism is ultimately the better of the two.
• Bioenhanced “Virtues” May Threaten Personal Identity. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 12 (2-3): 117-119. 2021. With Gina Lebkuecher, Kit Rempala, Sydney Samoska, and Marley Hornewer.
  Fabiano argues that virtue theory offers the best “safety framework” for mitigating the risks of moral enhancement (1). He advances five desiderata for an ideal safety framework and then explains how virtue theory satisfies each. Among these desiderata is the “preservation of identity” (1). Fabiano argues that moral enhancement can safely preserve personal identity when carried out within the fram…Read more

  Fabiano argues that virtue theory offers the best “safety framework” for mitigating the risks of moral enhancement (1). He advances five desiderata for an ideal safety framework and then explains how virtue theory satisfies each. Among these desiderata is the “preservation of identity” (1). Fabiano argues that moral enhancement can safely preserve personal identity when carried out within the framework of virtue theory. We suggest Fabiano's argument for this conclusion falls short, since contra Fabiano’s claim, enhancing virtues may not preserve—and could even damage—personal identity. We draw on three sources of evidence: 1) virtue theory scholarship that argues for the importance of habituation for virtue formation, 2) Focquaert and Schermer’s (2015) distinction between active and passive enhancement and attendant endorsement of more active paths to virtue enhancement, and 3) empirical research suggesting that technologies which support moral enhancements may have damaging effects on personal identity.
• Double Effect Donation. The Linacre Quarterly 88 (2): 149-162. 2021. With Charles Camosy.
  Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others, and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one fo…Read more

  Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others, and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one’s death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation, and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.
• Philosophy Labs. Teaching Philosophy 44 (2): 187-206. 2021. With Kit Rempala and Katrina Sifferd.
  Conversation is a foundational aspect of philosophical pedagogy. Too often, however, philosophical research becomes disconnected from this dialogue, and is instead conducted as a solitary endeavor. We aim to bridge the disconnect between philosophical pedagogy and research by proposing a novel framework. Philosophy labs, we propose, can function as both a pedagogical tool and a model for conductin…Read more

  Conversation is a foundational aspect of philosophical pedagogy. Too often, however, philosophical research becomes disconnected from this dialogue, and is instead conducted as a solitary endeavor. We aim to bridge the disconnect between philosophical pedagogy and research by proposing a novel framework. Philosophy labs, we propose, can function as both a pedagogical tool and a model for conducting group research. Our review of collaborative learning literature suggests that philosophy labs, like traditional STEM labs, can harness group learning models such as Positive Interdependence Theory (PIT) to engage in meaningful discussion and execute projects and research. This article distills PIT into four essential tenets which we argue support student success at both the individual and group levels. Our argument is grounded in two case studies detailing our experiences facilitating different philosophy labs, and demonstrations of how they can foster the continued evolution of philosophical research and pedagogy beyond the single-occupancy armchair.
• Cognitive Enhancement and Autonomous Vehicles: What Differences in Social and Individual Endorsement Imply. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4): 243-245. 2020. With Rohan Meda and Sarah Khan.
  Among other findings presented by Dinh et al. (2020), the authors conclude that people accept cognitive enhancement (CE) more readily when it is used by others than by themselves. In fact, in study...
• Holding On: A Community Approach to Autonomy in Dementia. American Journal of Bioethics 20 (8): 107-109. 2020. With Kit Rempala, Marley Hornewer, Rohan Meda, and Sarah Khan.
  Volume 20, Issue 8, August 2020, Page 107-109.
• Integrating Neuroethics and Neuroscience: A Framework. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (3): 217-218. 2020. With Sarah Khan, Sydney Samoska, Marley Hornewer, Rohan Meda, and Kit Rempala.
  The BRAIN 2.0 Neuroethics Report reflects on the ways in which neuroscientific research may inform our understanding of concepts such as consciousness and empathy, and how advances in this understanding might in turn affect practices such as research on non-human animal primates. Generally, the Report calls for “the integration of neuroscience and neuroethics during the remaining years of the BRAI…Read more

  The BRAIN 2.0 Neuroethics Report reflects on the ways in which neuroscientific research may inform our understanding of concepts such as consciousness and empathy, and how advances in this understanding might in turn affect practices such as research on non-human animal primates. Generally, the Report calls for “the integration of neuroscience and neuroethics during the remaining years of the BRAIN initiative and beyond” (NIH 2019). In responding to the Report, the articles in this issue grapple with theoretical questions about what the integration of neuroscience and neuroethics might look like, as well as how specific practices might be affected. In this commentary, we don’t grapple with these questions ourselves. Instead, we propose a framework for debates about them. Specifically, we introduce the idea of ‘morally-salient features,’ suggesting that the concept may be helpful in providing a framework for the kinds of questions addressed by the BRAIN 2.0 Neuroethics Report as well as those tackled by the authors of this issue.
• From Knowing to Understanding: Revisiting Consent. American Journal of Bioethics 20 (5): 33-35. 2020. With Kit Rempala, Marley Hornewer, Rohan Meda, and Sarah Khan.
  Dickert et al. (2020) effectively address how factors such as time limitations, stress, and illness severity in acute conditions warrant a deeper evaluation of how current consent processes serve patients. While data suggests that patients “prefer to be asked for permission upfront rather than waiving consent” (2), consent forms themselves “are frequently long and technical, follow rigid templates…Read more

  Dickert et al. (2020) effectively address how factors such as time limitations, stress, and illness severity in acute conditions warrant a deeper evaluation of how current consent processes serve patients. While data suggests that patients “prefer to be asked for permission upfront rather than waiving consent” (2), consent forms themselves “are frequently long and technical, follow rigid templates, and contain language that appears to prioritize institutional protection” (1). Such findings elucidate patients’ valuation of personal agency over settling for the “benefit of the doubt” that physicians and the consent forms they provide are acting in the patients’ best interests. In response, the authors recommend revisions to consent forms in terms of content, structure, and tone to better facilitate patient understanding beyond the mere conveyance of information. We aim to build Dickert et al.’s discussion of how “consent processes serve functions beyond facilitating an informed, autonomous decision” (2), but with a broader focus on an underrecognized purpose of the consent process: namely, reaffirming a patient’s status as a capable, rational agent. Specifically, we argue that patients can exercise this agency when they thoroughly understand the consent process, per Grimm’s (2012) conception of understanding.
• BCI-Mediated Action, Blame, and Responsibility. American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 11. 2020. With Kit Rempala.
  Rainey et al. (forthcoming) discuss the complications that arise with assigning responsibility for brain computer interface (BCI)-mediated actions. Because BCI-mediated actions can differ from non-BCI-mediated actions in terms of control and foreseeability, the authors suggest that our ethical and legal evaluation of these actions may differ in important ways. While we take no issue with the autho…Read more

  Rainey et al. (forthcoming) discuss the complications that arise with assigning responsibility for brain computer interface (BCI)-mediated actions. Because BCI-mediated actions can differ from non-BCI-mediated actions in terms of control and foreseeability, the authors suggest that our ethical and legal evaluation of these actions may differ in important ways. While we take no issue with the authors’ discussion or conclusion, we also recognize the difficulty of grappling with the relationship between control, foreseeability, and moral responsibility practices, even without the additional complications introduced by BCI-mediation. In this commentary, we therefore consider BCI-mediated action against the backdrop of a different--perhaps less murky--normative framework: blame.
• From Solo Decision Maker to Multi-Stakeholder Process: A Defense and Recommendations. American Journal of Bioethics 20 (2): 53-55. 2020. With David Ozar, Kit Rempala, and Rohan Meda.
  Berger (2019) argues effectively that “representativeness is more aptly understood as a variable that is multidimensional and continuous based on relational moral authority,” and also makes some useful suggestions about how taking this observation seriously might require changes in current patterns of practice regarding surrogates. But the essay raises additional important questions about how the …Read more

  Berger (2019) argues effectively that “representativeness is more aptly understood as a variable that is multidimensional and continuous based on relational moral authority,” and also makes some useful suggestions about how taking this observation seriously might require changes in current patterns of practice regarding surrogates. But the essay raises additional important questions about how the Best Interest Standard (BIS) should be used among unrepresented patients and other patients as well because many surrogates besides those who “have no actionable knowledge of a patient’s preferences” find themselves in positions in which they need to determine, with the physician, what is in the patient’s best interests. In this commentary, we therefore provide support for the ethical superiority of BIS judgments made by a multi-stakeholder process (rather than solo decision-makers), and sketch a process by which such judgments might be made.
• From Epistemic Trespassing to Transdisciplinary Cooperation: The Role of Expertise in the Identification of Usual Care. American Journal of Bioethics 20 (1): 52-54. 2020. With Kit Rempala, Molly Klug, and Marley Hornewer.
  According to Macklin & Natanson (2019), one reason unusual practices can be misidentified as usual care is that “instead of using pertinent, accurate information describing usual care, investigators may rely on the opinion of ‘experts’ in the field, whose information may be out of date or otherwise inaccurate." We find Macklin & Natanson’s insights about misattributed expertise crucial, and sugges…Read more

  According to Macklin & Natanson (2019), one reason unusual practices can be misidentified as usual care is that “instead of using pertinent, accurate information describing usual care, investigators may rely on the opinion of ‘experts’ in the field, whose information may be out of date or otherwise inaccurate." We find Macklin & Natanson’s insights about misattributed expertise crucial, and suggest their discussion can be elucidated further by characterizing it in the context of Ballantyne (2018)’s recent exploration of what he calls epistemic trespassing. What insights can be drawn from this characterization? In this commentary, we highlight two. First, the characterization elucidates the serious consequences that can result from epistemic trespassing. Second, the characterization of Macklin & Natanson’s cases as instances of epistemic trespassing offers us a potential roadmap for overcoming some of the problems the authors identify.
• How to Power Encultured Minds. Synthese 197. 2020. With Charles Lassiter.
  Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers — which holds that powers are causal…Read more

  Cultural psychologists often describe the relationship between mind and culture as ‘dynamic.’ In light of this, we provide two desiderata that a theory about encultured minds ought to meet: the theory ought to reflect how cultural psychologists describe their own findings and it ought to be thoroughly naturalistic. We show that a realist theory of causal powers — which holds that powers are causally-efficacious and empirically-discoverable — fits the bill. After an introduction to the major concepts in cultural psychology and describing causal power realism, we use a case study — the effects of pathogen prevalence on culture and cognition — to show the explanatory capacities of the powers framework.
• When Does Consciousness Matter? Lessons from the Minimally Conscious State. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1): 5-15. 2018.
  Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some …Read more

  Patients in a minimally conscious state (MCS) fall into a different diagnostic category than patients in the more familiar vegetative states (VS). Not only are MCS patients conscious in some sense, they have a higher chance for recovery than VS patients. Because of these differences, we ostensibly have reason to provide MCS patients with care that goes beyond what we provide to patients with some VS patients. But how to justify this differential treatment? I argue we can’t justify it solely by looking to MCS patients’ actual levels of consciousness. We must look also to the ways in which these patients are potentially conscious. Specifically, I argue that certain sensible and well-regarded policy recommendations cannot be justified by looking solely to patients’ actual levels of consciousness, but that they can be justified by looking to patients’ potential for consciousness. Insofar then as we have prima facie reason to follow the recommendations, we also have prima facie reason to view the potential for consciousness as morally salient. If that is true, however, several important implications follow: first, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this translates into actual and pressing obligations to patients with disorders of consciousness generally. Second, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this has implications that go beyond our obligations to patients with disorders of consciousness. Indeed, if the potential for consciousness is morally salient, this adds an important layer of complexity to the normative landscape, a layer we may not have sufficiently noticed before.
• Enduring Questions and the Ethics of Memory Blunting. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (2): 227-246. 2017.
  Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue bot…Read more

  Memory blunting is a pharmacological intervention that decreases the emotional salience of memories. The technique promises a brighter future for those suffering from memory-related disorders such as PTSD, but it also raises normative questions about the limits of its permissibility. So far, neuroethicists have staked out two primary camps in response to these questions. In this paper, I argue both are problematic. I then argue for an alternative approach to memory blunting, one that can accommodate the considerations that motivate rival approaches even while avoiding the problems these rivals face. In addition to arguing for this primary thesis, the paper also aims to suggest something about neuroethics generally: despite what some neuroethicists claim, new discoveries in neuroscience may not typically upend traditional views of morality. Rather, discoveries in neuroscience often provide us with new occasions to reflect on enduring questions about what it means to be human.
• Why Narrative Identity Matters: Preserving Authenticity in Neurosurgical Interventions. American Journal of Bioethics: Neuroscience 8 (3): 186-88. 2017.
  Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whe…Read more

  Jecker & Ko (2017) argue that numerical identity is not the only aspect of identity that matters to patients faced with certain neurosurgical interventions. Put differently: surviving an intervention in the numerical sense—being numerically the same person before and after the intervention—is not enough. It also matters whether an intervention preserves a patient’s narrative identity, that is, whether an intervention allows the patient’s “inner story” to continue. I agree with the authors’ conclusion. I believe, however, that further work can be done to show precisely why narrative identity matters. We can accept Jecker & Ko’s conclusion, but still wonder: why should it matter to us that our inner story continues? In this response, I suggest that the reason rests on a more basic concern we have with living authentic lives. We are concerned with preserving our narrative identities because we want to live authentic lives rather than inauthentic ones. If that’s the case, however, those considering neurosurgical interventions such as deep brain stimulation and temporal lobectomy should not only pay attention to ways the interventions may support or undermine narrative identity, but also to broader considerations about the ways these interventions may support or undermine one’s living an authentic life.
• Three Kinds of Agency and Closed Loop Neural Devices. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2): 90-91. 2017.
  Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be constru…Read more

  Goering and colleagues (2017) acknowledge closed-loop neural devices have the potential to undermine agency. Indeed, the authors observe that “the agent using the device may . . . sometimes doubt whether she is the author of her action, given that the device may operate in ways that are not transparent to her” (65). Still, the authors ultimately argue that closed-loop neural devices may be construed as supporting agency, especially when we view agency from a relational perspective. The reason? We often manifest our agency in relation with others. For example, family and close friends sometimes step in to support us in setting and achieving our aims. In a similar way, then, the authors argue that “we can imagine [a closed-loop] device stepping in to support the user in achieving her aim” (67). Closed-loop neural devices, in other words, can be construed as supporting one’s agency in much the same way as other people can be seen as supporting one’s agency. The authors thus conclude that when we view agents from a relational perspective, closed-loop neural devices may be viewed as supporting rather than undermining agency. I largely agree with the authors’ conclusion. I also believe, however, that their discussion can be clarified by distinguishing three kinds of agency and viewing closed-loop neural devices from the perspective of each. By thinking carefully about agency, we can see more clearly the ways in which it is undermined by closed-loop neural devices, as well as the way in which these devices may support agency.
• Personhood and Natural Kinds: Why Cognitive Status Need Not Affect Moral Status. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (3): 261-277. 2017.
  Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively…Read more

  Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively impaired. On the account for which I argue, an individual is a person just in case that individual belongs to a natural kind that is normally characterized by advanced cognitive capacities. Since “human being” is just such a natural kind, individual human beings can be persons even when they do not themselves have advanced cognitive capacities. I argue, furthermore, that we have good reason to accept this account of personhood over rival accounts since it is uniquely able to accommodate the intuitive concept of an impaired person.
• Is Neuroscience Relevant to Our Moral Responsibility Practices? Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (2): 61-82. 2014.
  Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the bra…Read more

  Some psychologists and philosophers have argued that neuroscience is importantly relevant to our moral responsibility practices, especially to our practices of praise and blame. For consider: on an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience presents us with a mechanistic account of human action. Furthermore, in uential studies – most notoriously, Libet et al. (1983) – seem to show that the brain decides to do things (so to speak) before we consciously make a decision. In light of these ndings, then – or so some have argued – we ought to revise our practices of praise and blame. In the current paper, I argue that this conclusion is unwarranted. The reason is that the argument for it depends on controversial non-empirical premises, premises we need not accept. I suggest, however, that neuroscience does bear on our moral responsibility practices in one important, if less revisionary, way. In particular, neuroscience o ers a new kind of evidence for determining when agents should be held exempt from our normal moral responsibility practices.

Book reviews

• Imagining a better future: Victoria Lorrimar: Human technological enhancement and theological anthropology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, 344 pp, $120 HB. Metascience 32 (3): 425-428. 2023.
• SCIENTISM AND SECULARISM: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology. Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 73 (1): 48-49. 2021. With Michael Burns.
  A review of J.P. Moreland's SCIENTISM AND SECULARISM: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology.
• Please Don't Call Us Jerks. The Philosopher 115. 2020. With Marley Hornewer, Sarah Khan, Rohan Meda, Kit Rempala, and Sydney Samoska.
  A review of Eric Schwitzgebel's book "A Theory of Jerks and Other Philosophical Misadventures" (2020)

Dissertation

• Consciousness Empowered. Dissertation, Fordham University. 2016.
  Understanding the difference between conscious and unconscious states is important for making sense of human cognition. Consider: your perception of these words is currently conscious while the feeling of the floor beneath your left foot presumably is not. But what does the difference between these states consist in? Contemporary philosophers disagree about how to answer this kind of question. Ext…Read more

  Understanding the difference between conscious and unconscious states is important for making sense of human cognition. Consider: your perception of these words is currently conscious while the feeling of the floor beneath your left foot presumably is not. But what does the difference between these states consist in? Contemporary philosophers disagree about how to answer this kind of question. Extrinsic theorists claim states are conscious because of how they are related to other states, entities, or processes. Intrinsic theorists deny this by claiming that consciousness is internal to states. As it stands, debates about consciousness are thus stuck at an impasse.^ So I approach things differently. In this dissertation, I argue there is a way to overcome the gridlock that plagues contemporary debates about consciousness, and to accommodate the considerations that motivate both intrinsic and extrinsic theorists. The way forward lies in developing a robust account of causal powers. Causal powers, on my view, correspond to dispositions things have. For example, salt’s disposition to dissolve in water corresponds to a power salt has: its solubility. Causal powers, moreover, can help us account for how things behave, for how and why things interact with each other in the ways they do. For example, we can account for salt’s dissolving in water by studying when and why salt manifests its power of solubility. ^ And we can also account for our conscious experiences in reference to causal powers. Indeed, I argue that just as salt manifests one of its powers when it dissolves in water, so too humans manifest one of their powers when they have conscious experiences—our conscious experiences can be understood in reference to the causal powers we have, and in reference to how and why we manifest these powers. Just as importantly, if we use causal powers as a basis for a theory of consciousness, we can overcome the current opposition between extrinsic and intrinsic theories, and in doing so, open up avenues for theorizing about consciousness anew.